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Abstract
Constructions of locally decodable codes (LDCs) have one of two undesirable properties: low rate
or high locality (polynomial in the length of the message). In settings where the encoder/decoder
have already exchanged cryptographic keys and the channel is a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT)
algorithm, it is possible to circumvent these barriers and design LDCs with constant rate and small
locality. However, the assumption that the encoder/decoder have exchanged cryptographic keys is often
prohibitive. We thus consider the problem of designing explicit and efficient LDCs in settings where the
channel is slightly more constrained than the encoder/decoder with respect to some resource e.g., space
or (sequential) time. Given an explicit function f that the channel cannot compute, we show how the
encoder can transmit a random secret key to the local decoder using f(·) and a random oracle H(·). We
then bootstrap the private key LDC construction of Ostrovsky, Pandey and Sahai (ICALP, 2007), thereby
answering an open question posed by Guruswami and Smith (FOCS 2010) of whether such bootstrapping
techniques are applicable to LDCs in channel models weaker than just PPT algorithms. Specifically, in
the random oracle model we show how to construct explicit constant rate LDCs with locality of polylog
in the security parameter against various resource constrained channels.
1 Introduction
Consider the classical one-way communication setting where two parties, the sender and receiver, com-
municate over a noisy channel that may corrupt parts of any message sent over it. An error correcting code
is an invertible transformation mapping messages into codewords that are then transmitted over the noisy
channel. The goal is to ensure that the decoder can (w.h.p.) reliably recover the entire message from the
corrupted codeword. For locally decodable codes (LDCs) we have an even stronger goal: The decoder should
be able to reliably recover any individual bit of the original message (w.h.p.) by examining at most ` bits
of the corrupted codeword. An ideal LDC should have a good rate (i.e., the codeword should not be much
longer than the original message) and small locality `.
Historically, there have been two major lines of work associated with modelling the channel behavior. In
Shannon’s symmetric channel model, the channel corrupts each bit of the codeword independently at random
with some fixed probability. By contrast, in Hamming’s adversarial channel model the channel corrupts the
codeword in a worst case manner subject to an upper bound on the total number of corruptions.
Unsurprisingly, when we work in Shannon’s channel model it is much easier to design LDCs with good
rate/locality. By contrast, state of the art LDC constructions for Hamming channels either have very high
locality e.g., ` = 2O(
√
logn log logn) [KMRS17] or poor rate e.g., Hadamard codes have constant locality
` = O (1) but the codeword has exponential length. Unfortunately, in many real-world settings independent
random noise is not a realistic model of channel behavior e.g., burst-errors are common in reality, but unlikely
in Shannon’s model. Thus, coding schemes designed to work in Shannon’s channel model are not necessarily
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suitable in practice. By contrast, coding schemes designed to work in Hamming’s adversarial setting must
be able to handle any error pattern.
Our central motivating goal is to find classes of adversarial channels that are expressive enough to model
any error patterns that would arise in nature, yet admit LDCs with good decoding algorithms. LDCs have
found remarkable applications throughout various fields, notably private information retrieval schemes [BI01,
CKGS98, KO97], psuedo-random generator constructions [BFNW91, STV01], self-correcting computations
[DJK+02, GLR+91], PCP systems [BFALS91] and fault tolerant storage systems [KT00].
Lipton [Lip94] introduced the adversarial computationally bounded model, where the channel was viewed
as a Hamming channel restricted to bounded corruption by a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm.
The notion of adversaries being computationally bounded is well-motivated by real-world channels that have
some sort of limitations on their computations i.e., we expect error patterns encountered in nature to be
modeled by some (possibly unknown) PPT algorithm. We argue that even Lipton’s channel significantly
overestimates the capability of the channel. For example, if the channel has reasonably small latency, say
10 seconds, and the world’s fastest single core processor can evaluate 10 billion instructions per second then
the depth of any (parallel) computation performed by the channel is at most 100 billion operations.
This view of modelling the channel as more restricted than just PPT was further explored by Guruswami
and Smith [GS16] who studied channels that could be described by simple (low-depth) circuits. Remark-
ably, even such a simple restriction allowed them to design codes that enjoyed no public/private key setup
assumptions, while matching the Shannon capacity using polynomial time encoding/decoding algorithms.
With such positive results, it is natural to ask whether similar results may be expected for LDCs.
1.1 Contributions
We introduce resource bounded adversarial channel models which admit LDCs with good locality whilst
still being expressive enough to plausibly capture any error pattern for most real-world channels. We argue
that these resource bounded channel models are already sufficiently expressive to model any corruption
pattern that might occur in nature e.g., burst-errors, correlated errors. For example, observe that the
channel must compute the entire error pattern before the codeword is delivered to the receiver. Thus, the
channel can be viewed as sequentially time bounded e.g., the channel may perform arbitrary computation in
parallel but the total depth of computation is bounded by the latency of the channel. The notion of a space
bound (or space-time bound) channel can be similarly motivated.
We introduce safe functions as a general way to characterize LDC friendly channels. Intuitively, a
function f is “safe” for a class of channels if the channel is not able to predict f(x) given x. We show how
to construct safe functions for several classes of resource bounded channels including time bounded, space
bounded, and cumulative memory cost bounded channels in the parallel random oracle model. For example,
in the random oracle model the function Ht+1(x) is a safe function for the class of sequentially time-bounded
adversaries i.e., it is not possible to evaluate the function using fewer than t sequential calls to the random
oracle H. We also discuss how to construct safe functions for the class of space (resp. space-time) bounded
channels using random oracles.
Furthermore, we give a general framework for designing good locally decodable codes against resource
bounded adversarial channels by using safe functions to bootstrap existing private-key LDC constructions.
Our framework assumes no a priori private or public key setup assumptions, and constructs explicit LDCs
over the binary alphabet1 with constant rate against any class of resource bounded adversaries admitting
safe functions.
Our local decoder can decode correctly with arbitrarily high constant probability after examining at
most O (f(κ)) bits of the corrupted codeword, where κ is the security parameter2 and f(κ) is any function
such that f(κ) = ω(log κ) e.g., f(κ) = log1+ε κ or f(κ) = log κ log log κ. By contrast, state of the art LDC
1Note that small alphabet sizes are attractive for practical channels designed to transmit bits efficiently.
2In this paper we use the security parameter κ in an asymptotic sense e.g., for any attacker running in time poly(κ)
there is a negligible function negl(κ) upper bounding the probability that the attacker succeeds. In particular, the function
negl(κ) = 2− log
1+ε κ) is negligible, but does not provide κ-bits of concrete security i.e., any attacker running in time t succeeds
with probability at most t2−κ.
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constructions for Hamming channels have very high locality e.g., 2O(
√
logn log logn) [KMRS17]. Our codes are
robust against a constant fraction of corruptions, and are (essentially) non-adaptive i.e., the local decoding
algorithm can decode after submitting just two batches of queries.
Our constructions stand at the intersection of coding theory and cryptography, using well-known tools
and techniques from cryptography to provide notions of (information theoretic) randomness and security for
communication protocols between sender/receiver. To prove the security of our constructions, we introduce
a two-phase distinguisher hybrid argument, which may be of independent interest for other coding theoretic
problems in these resource bounded channel models.
1.2 Technical Overview
Private LDCs. Our starting point is the private locally decodable codes of [OPS07]. These LDCs permit
nearly optimal query complexity, asymptotically positive rate and reliable decoding with high probability,
but make the strong assumption that the sender and receiver have already exchanged a secret key K that is
unknown to the PPT adversarial channel over which they communicate. In our setting the sender and the
receiver do not have access to any secret key. Our constructions thus reduce the general setting (no setup
assumptions) against resource bounded channels to the shared private key setting against these channels, so
that we can bootstrap private LDC constructions.
Bootstrapped Encoder/Decoder. Our encoder uses the following high level template: (1) samples a
random seed r (2) computes a predetermined safe function f(r) on the seed and extracts a secret key K
from f(r) (e.g., using a random oracle) (3) Uses the private LDC encoder to encode the message using K
(4) appends a reliable encoding (repetition code) of the random seed r to the codeword. The local decoder
(1) decodes the random seed r (random sampling + majority vote). (2) Evaluates the safe function f(r) to
recover the secret key K. (3) Uses the private LDC decoder with the secret key K to recover the desired bit
of the original message.
Security Proof. We remark that there are a few subtle challenges that arise when we prove that our
bootstrapped construction is secure. We want to prove that the channel will (w.h.p.) fail to produce a
corrupted codeword that fools the local decoding algorithm. Towards this goal we might try to prove that
the channel cannot distinguish the derived key K from a truly random key even given the nonce r. However,
this is insufficient to prove that the local decoder is successful because the local decoder is able to recover
K from f . We introduce a novel two-phase distinguisher game to address these challenges. In particular,
we consider an attacker-distinguisher pair who tries to predict whether or not the secret encoding key K is
derived from the nonce r (b = 0) or was selected uniformly at random (b = 1). In phase 1 the (resource
bounded) attacker generates a corrupted codeword which is given to the distinguisher in phase 2 who must
then guess whether b = 1 or b = 0. The distinguisher is computationally unbounded, but is not allowed to
query the random oracle. If f is a safe function then the advantage of any such attacker-distinguisher pair
can be shown to be negligible. We demonstrate that any channel which succeeds at fooling our local decoder
yields an attacker-distinguisher pair for this two phase game — the distinguisher works by simulating the
private LDC decoder to distinguish between the two aforementioned encodings. It follows that the channel
cannot fool the local decoder (except with negligible probability).
1.3 Related Work
Many existing code constructions consider an underlying channel that can only introduce a bounded
number of errors, but has an unlimited time to adversarially decide the positions of these errors. These codes
are therefore resilient to any possible error pattern with a bounded number of corruptions, corresponding to
Hamming’s error model, and are safe for data transmission. However, this resiliency to the worst-case error
leads to coding limitations and some possibly undesirable tradeoffs. On one hand, current constructions for
LDCs that focus on efficient encoding can obtain any constant rate R < 1 while simultaneously being robust
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to any constant fraction δ < 1−R of errors and using 2O(
√
logn log logn) queries for decoding [KMRS17]. On
the other hand, codes that focus on low query complexity obtain blocklength that is subexponential in the
message length while using a constant number of queries q ≤ 3 [Yek08, Efr12, DGY11]. Finally, if exactly
q = 2 queries are desired, any code must use blocklength exponential in the message length [KdW04].
Avoiding such drastic tradeoffs between blocklength and query complexity would be attractive for other
natural channels in contrast to Hamming’s error model. For example, Shannon introduces a model in which
each symbol has some independent probability of being corrupted; this probability is generally fixed across
all symbols and known a priori. However, this probabilistic channel may be too weak to capture natural
phenomenon such as bursts of consecutive error.
Thus it is reasonable to believe that many natural channels lie between these two extremes; in particular,
Lipton [Lip94] argues that many reasonable channels are computationally bounded and can be modeled as
PPT algorithms. In this model, [Lip94] introduced an analog to classical error-correcting codes that is robust
to a fraction of errors beyond the rates provably tolerable by any code in the adversarial Hamming channel
model. Similarly, a line of work [Lip94, MPSW05, GS16, SS16] have improved upon the error rate limits
of classical error-correcting codes in slight variants of Lipton’s computationally bounded channel model. A
weakness of the codes introduced by [Lip94] is the strong cryptographic assumption that the sender and
receiver share a secret random string unknown to the channel. This weakness is ameliorated by [MPSW05],
who observe that if a message is encoded by digitally signing a code that is list-decodable with a secret
key, then an adversarial PPT is unlikely to produce valid signatures. Conversely, the decoder can select the
unique message from the list of possible messages with a valid signature, effectively producing public-key
error-correcting codes against computationally bounded channels. Subsequently, [GS16] further removes the
public-key setup assumption specifically for the channel in which either the error is independent of the actual
message being sent, or the errors can be described by polynomial size circuits. Their results are based on the
idea that the sender can choose a permutation and some key that is computable by the decoder but not by
the channel, since it operates with low complexity. In some loose sense, their results are an example of our
framework when the channel has bounded circuit complexity, i.e. the bounded resource is circuit complexity
of the error.
[OPS07] obtain LDCs with constant information and error rates over the binary alphabet against com-
putationally bounded errors, using a small number of queries to the corrupted word; specifically they can
achieve any ω(log κ) query complexity, where κ is the desired security parameter. However, their results not
only assume the existence of one-way functions, but also once again assume a predetermined private key
known to both the encoder and decoder but not the channel, similar to [Lip94]. Analogous to the improve-
ments of [MPSW05] for classical error codes, [HO08, HOSW11] construct public-key LDCs, assuming the
existence of Φ-hiding schemes [CMS99] and IND-CPA secure cryptosystems.
Ben-Sasson et al. [BGH+06] introduce the concept of relaxed locally decodable codes (RLDCs) as an
alternative means of decreasing the tradeoffs between rate and locality in classical LDCs. In contrast to
LDCs, the decoding algorithm for RLDCs is allowed to output ⊥ sometimes to reveal that the correct value
is unknown, though it is limited in the fraction of outputs in which it can output ⊥. The RLDCs proposed
by Ben-Sasson et al. [BGH+06] obtain constant query complexity and blocklength n = k1+. Subsequently,
Gur et al. [GRR18] construct relaxed locally correctable codes (RLCCs) with attractive properties but signif-
icant tradeoffs; they propose codes with constant query complexity and error rate but block length roughly
quartic in the message length as well as codes with constant error rate and linear block length, but quasipoly-
nomial ((log n)O(log logn)) query complexity. These parameters are significantly better than classical locally
correctable codes and their results immediately extend to RLDCs, since the original message is embedded
within the initial part of the encoding. However, these tradeoffs are still undesirable.
Recently, Blocki et al. [BGGZ19] study RLDCs and RLCCs on adversarial but computationally bounded
channels in an effort to reduce these tradeoffs. They obtain RLDCs and RLCCs over the binary alphabet,
with constant information rate, and poly-logarithmic locality. Moreover, their codes require no public-key or
private-key cryptographic setup; the only setup assumption required is the selection of the public parameters
(seed) for a collision-resistant hash function.
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2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notation
We use the notation [n] to represent the set {1, 2, . . . , n}. For any x, y ∈ Σn, let HAM(x) denote the
Hamming weight of x, i.e. the number of non-zero coordinates of x. Let HAM(x, y) = HAM(x − y) denote
the Hamming distance between the vectors x and y. All logarithms will be base 2. For n vectors x1, . . . , xn,
we use majority(x1 · · ·xn) to denote the vector that appears most frequently. If such a vector is not unique,
then an arbitrary vector of highest frequency is chosen. For any vector x ∈ Σn, let x[i] be the ith coordinate
of x. We also let x ◦ y denote the concatenation of x with y and x ⊕ y denote the bitwise XOR of x and
y. For a randomized function f(·), the notation f(·;R) will be used to denote that f(·) uses random coins
R as its randomness. A function negl(κ) is said to be negligible in κ if negl(κ) ∈ o
(∣∣∣ 1poly(κ) ∣∣∣) for any non-
zero polynomial poly(·). Finally, we distinguish between inputs and parameters to a function f as follows:
f(inputs · · · )[parameters · · · ].
2.2 Locally Decodable Codes
We consider the setting where sender S encodes a message x into a codeword y using an encoding
algorithm so that y is sent over noisy channel C, which then hands over the possibly corrupted codeword y′
to R, who then uses a decoding algorithm to obtain the original message. We denote x ∈ Σk and y ∈ ΣK
where Σ is the alphabet. We denote the alphabet size by q = |Σ|. We consider the model where y′ corresponds
to y with some symbols replaced with others in Σ. The term corruptions refers to such symbol replacements
within y, with a single corruption meaning a single symbol replacement, so that y′ ∈ ΣK . The encoding and
decoding algorithms are denoted by Enc : Σk → ΣK and Dec : ΣK → Σk. We use the terms sender, encoder,
and encoding algorithm interchangeably, and similarly for receiver, decoder, and decoding algorithm.
A code is an encoder-decoder pair. The information rate or simply rate of the code is the ratio k/K,
so that a lower rate corresponds to a larger amount of information redundancy introduced by the code. The
message length, codeword length, and alphabet size characterize a coding scheme. Coding schemes with high
rate and low alphabet size are desired.
An error correcting code allows the decoder to recover the entire original message x by reading the
entire y′. It is also possible to construct codes that only need to read a few symbols of y′ rather than the
entire message to recover a small part of the message. Such codes are called locally decodable codes (LDC),
and will be the focus of this work. An LDC has locality `, error rate ρ and error correction probability p if
any character of x may be recovered with probability at least p by making at most ` queries to y′, even when
the channel corrupts ρ fraction of all symbols of y to generate y′. We use the terms query complexity and
locality interchangeably. When ρ and p are clear from context (as constants), the scheme may be referred
to as an `-LDC. Naturally, LDCs with low locality, high error rate, and high error correction probability are
desired.
2.3 Definitions
The focus of this work will be the construction of LDCs (Section 2.4) for resource-bounded channels (Section
4.1). In this section, we present several building blocks that we will require in our constructions — LDC∗s,
private-LDCs and safe functions. We first give two classical definitions pertaining to LDCs that compactly
summarize our discussion in Section 2.2.
Definition 1. A (K, k)q-coding scheme C[K, k, q] = (Enc,Dec) is a pair of encoding Enc : Σk → ΣK and
decoding Dec : ΣK → Σk algorithms where |Σ| = q. The information rate of the scheme is defined as kK .
Definition 2. A (K, k)q-coding scheme C[K, k, q] = (Enc,Dec) is an (`, ρ, p)-locally decodable code (LDC)
if Dec, with query access to a word y′ such that HAM(Enc(x), y′) ≤ ρK, on input index i ∈ [k], makes at
most ` queries to y′ and outputs xi with probability at least p over the randomness of the decoder.
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Next, we present a simple variant of LDCs which we denote by LDC∗s. These will be very similar to LDCs
except that they are required to decode the entire original message while making as few queries to the
corrupted codeword as possible. They are defined with respect to the same setting as in Section 2.2.
Definition 3. A (K, k)q-coding scheme C[K, k, q] = (Enc,Dec) is an (`, ρ, p)-LDC∗ if Dec, with query access
to a word y′ such that HAM(Enc(x), y′) ≤ ρK, makes at most ` queries to y′ and outputs x with probability
at least p over the randomness of the decoder.
We remark that it will be typically desired that for an LDC∗ C[K, k, q], the locality be O (k) even when K is
very large. We now move on to define private-LDCs analogous to Definition 2 as an alternative to that given
by [OPS07] – refer to Appendix D for an overview of [OPS07].
priv− LDC− Sec− Game[A, x, κ, ρ, p] :
1. The challenger generates a secret key sk← GenKey(1κ), computes the codeword y ← Enc(x, κ, sk) for the message
x and sends the codeword y to the attacker.
2. The attacker outputs a corrupted codeword y′ ← A (x, y, κ, ρ, p, k,K) where y′ ∈ ΣK should have hamming distance
at most ρK from y.
3. The output of the experiment is determined as follows:
priv− LDC− Sec− Game[A, x, κ, ρ, p] =
{
1 if HAM(y, y′) ≤ ρK and ∃i ≤ k s.t. Pr[Decy′ (i, κ, sk) = xi] < p
0 otherwise
If the output of the experiment is 1 (resp. 0), the attacker A is said to win (resp. lose) against C.
Figure 1: priv− LDC− Sec− Game defining the interaction between an attacker and an honest party
Definition 4. (One-Time Private Key LDC) A triplet of probabilistic algorithms C[K, k, κ] = (GenKey,Enc,Dec)
is an (`, ρ, p, ,C)-private locally decodable code (private LDC) against a class C if Dec makes at most `
queries and for all attackers A ∈ C and all messages x ∈ Σk we have
Pr[priv-LDC-Sec-Game[A, x, κ, ρ, p] = 1] ≤ 
where the probability is taken over all the random coins of A and GenKey. If C is the set of all (computa-
tionally unbounded) attackers we simply say that the scheme is a (`, ρ, p, )-private LDC.
Our contributions in the subsequent sections will assume that the coding scheme and channel all have
access to a random oracle. Furthermore, we assume that the channel is a pROM algorithm with respect to
this random oracle (refer to the initial discussion in Section 4.1 for an overview of the pROM model). The
following definition establishes a notion of privacy against classes (i.e. sets) of adversarial channels in terms
of “hard to compute” functions.
Definition 5 (Safe Function). We say that a function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}∗ is δ-safe for a class C of
algorithms if for all A ∈ C we have
Pr
[A(x) = f(x)] ≤ δ
where the probability is taken over the random coins of A and the selection of an input x ∈ {0, 1}n. If the
function f = fH(·) is defined using a random oracle, then the probability Pr
[AH(·)(x) = fH(·)(x)] is also
taken over the selection of the random oracle H(·).
We will use the notation SC to denote a δ−safe function for class C. In the above definition, we usually think
of δ as being a negligibly small parameter. We remark that in the parallel random oracle model, one can
construct functions with sharp thresholds on the required resources. For example, the function Ht+1(x) is
trivial to compute using at most t+ 1 sequential queries to H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}2, but any parallel algorithm
making at most q queries over t rounds succeeds with probability at most δ = (t2 + tq)/2w.
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Precomputation. Definition 5 can be extended to consider an attacker who is allowed to perform pre-
computation with the random oracle H(·) before receiving the input x. In particular, we could consider a
pair of oracle algorithms (A1,A2) where AH(·)1 (m) outputs an m-bit hint σ ∈ {0, 1}m for A2 after making at
most q queries to H(·). We could modify the definition to require that for all A2 ∈ C we have
Pr
[
AH(·)2 (x,AH(·)1 (m)) = fH(·)(x)
]
≤ δ ,
where the randomness is taken over the selection of x, the random oracle H(·), and the random coins of A2.
Here, AH(·)1 (m) (precomputation) is not necessarily constrained to be in the same class C as A2.
We remark that for k = m/w, a precomputing attacker can succeed with probability at least k/2n by
having AH(·)1 (m) output the hint σ = fH(·)(1), . . . , fH(·)(k). Then AH(·)2 (x, σ) first checks if x ∈ {1, . . . , k}
and, if so, simply returns the output fH(·)(x) which is already recorded in the hint σ. Thus, we need the
length n of the random nonce x to be sufficiently large to resist brute-force precomputation attacks. By
contrast, if the attacker does not get to perform any precomputation then δ can be negligible even when
n = O (1).
All of the safe functions we consider would also be secure under this stronger notion. For example,
Ht+1(x) is δ-safe for δ = O ((qt+ t2)/2w + qt/2n) where x is a random n bit string, A1 makes at most q
total random oracle queries, and A2 makes at most q total queries in at most t rounds to H(·). In our LDC
constructions we select a random nonce of length Ω(log1+ε κ) to ensure that a precomputing attacker fails.
2.4 Our Model
We first define an experiment to model the interaction between a code and an algorithm from a class
of pROM algorithms adversarial against the code. For random oracle H(·), let C = (EncH(·),DecH(·)) be
a (K, k)q-coding scheme in the random oracle model and let C be a class of pROM algorithms. Then,
the interaction of AH(·) ∈ C having error rate ρ, with the code C is defined in Figure 2 (analogous to
priv-LDC-Sec-Game defined in Figure 1). Here, the security parameter κ, and the decoding probability p
are also given as inputs to the game. We now formally define a notion of LDCs analogous to Definition 2,
but with respect to general classes of adversarial (pROM) channels.
LDC− Sec− Game[A, x,H, κ, ρ, p] :
1. The challenger computes y ← EncH(·)(x, κ) encoding the message x and sends y ∈ ΣK to the attacker.
2. The channelAH(·) outputs a corrupted codeword y′ ← AH(·) (x, y, κ, ρ, p, k,K) where y′ ∈ ΣK should have hamming
distance at most ρK from y.
3. The output of the experiment is determined as follows:
LDC− Sec− Game[A, x,H, κ, ρ, p] =
{
1 if HAM(y, y′) ≤ ρK and ∃i ≤ k such that Pr[Decy′,H(·)(i, κ) = xi] < p
0 otherwise
If the output of the experiment is 1 (resp. 0), the channel is said to win (resp. lose).
Figure 2: LDC− Sec− Game defining the interaction between an attacker and an honest party
Definition 6. Let C be a class of pROM algorithms. A (K, k)q-coding scheme C[K, k, q] = (EncH(·),DecH(·))
is an (`, ρ, p, ,C)-locally decodable code (LDC) if DecH(·) makes at most ` queries and for all AH(·) ∈ C and
all messages x ∈ Σk we have
Pr[LDC− Sec− Game[A, x,H, κ, ρ, p] = 1] ≤ 
where the probability is taken over the random coins of AH(·)and the selection of the random oracle H.
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We remark that our codes need not require that each message have the same length. Jumping slightly
ahead, longer messages only need proportionally longer repetition codes to guarantee transmittance of the
secret key. However for the sake of presentation, we use notation for fixed length messages.
3 Constructions
We begin by discussing the use of safe functions in Section 3.1 and give several examples of constructing
such functions in Section 4. We then show how allowing an encoder/decoder pair with enough resources to
compute safe functions can effectively generate a random shared secret key between the pair. This secret key
can then be bootstrapped into existing private LDC constructions to give codes against resource bounded
adversaries. We give our final framework in Section 3.2 and the main proofs in Sections 3.3 and 3.4.
3.1 Using Safe Functions
Let C be a class of algorithms with safe function SC. For some input x ∈ {0, 1}n to AH(·) ∈ C, we will
be interested in bounding the probability of the undesirable event where the AH(·)queries the random oracle
at any string of the form y ◦ SC(x) with y ∈ {0, 1}dlog2 αe. In the absence of such an event, H(SC(x)) would
information theoretically appear random to AH(·). Lemma 1 shows that such an event may only happen
with negligible probability q where q is the total number of random oracle queries.
Lemma 1. For a some class C of pROM algorithms with δ−safe function SC{0, 1}n → {0, 1}∗, let badA be
the event that on some input x ∈ {0, 1}n, AH(·) ∈ C queries the random oracle at α ◦ SC(x) for any α > 0.
Then Pr[badA] ≤ qδ, where q is the number of oracle queries made by AH(·).
Proof. We prove the claim by a reduction argument. By way of contradiction, suppose there exists a BH(·) ∈ C
such that on input string x, BH(·) makes q queries to the random oracle H(·) and Pr[badB] > q. We construct
an adversary AH(·) as follows: on input x, the adversary
• Simulates BH(·) with input x
• Keeps track of all q queries by which BH(·) queries the random oracle
• On termination of BH(·), returns the suffix of length |SC(x)| from one of the q queries selected uniformly
at random
However, we know that BH(·) queries the random oracle at α ◦ SC(x) with probability > qδ. Since AH(·)
picks one of BH(·)’s queries at random, Pr[AH(·)(x) = SC(x)] > δ, which contradicts the definition of δ−safe
function.
Assuming that AH(·)never queries the random oracle at any point of the form y ◦ SC(x) with y ∈
{0, 1}dlog2 αe (for some α > 0) we can view each H(y ◦ SC(x)) as a fresh w-bit string. Thus, we can obtain
a random wα-bit string by concatenating all of the labels H(y ◦ SC(x)) for each y ∈ {0, 1}dlog2 αe. This
motivates the following definition of an expansion family which will be used in subsequent sections.
Definition 7 (Expansion Family). For random oracle H(·) the expansion family of functions {EH(·)α }∞α=1
where each function EH(·)α : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}αw is defined as EH(·)α (x) = H(1 ◦ x) ◦ H(2 ◦ x) ◦ · · · ◦ H(α ◦ x),
where the prefix i ∈ [α] of x for each oracle query in the definition is expressed in binary using dlog2 αe bits.
3.2 Framework for LDCs against Resource Bounded Channels
Our aim in this section will be to achieve LDCs having no asymptotic loss in rate, query complexity, or
success probability of private locally decodable codes. In contrast to the private LDC setting, we will assume
no private (or public) key setup assumptions. We will also aim for LDCs that may be used for multiple
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Figure 3: Instantiation of framework for LDCs against adversaries permitting safe functions
(polynomial) rounds of communication, a notion which we describe later in the section.
Let Cldc∗ [Kldc∗ , kldc∗ ] = (Encldc∗ ,Decldc∗) be an (`ldc∗ , ρldc∗ , pldc∗)−LDC∗(recall Definition 3). Further-
more, let Cpriv[Kpriv, kpriv] = (Encpriv,Decpriv,GenKeypriv) be a (`priv, ρpriv, ppriv, priv)−private LDC (recall Def-
inition 4). Against classes of pROM algorithms permitting δ−safe functions, our encoder will use Cldc∗ to
bootstrap off of Cpriv even in the absence of shared private randomness with the decoder.
Framework Overview: The encoding algorithm first samples a random seed r of modest length (kldc∗).
By embedding an encoding of r (via Cldc∗) in our final codeword, we can ensure that our decoder will also
have access to r. Let the channel, over which the communication happens, belong to a class C of pROM
algorithms (w.r.t. random oracle H(·)) permitting some δ-safe function SC : {0, 1}kldc∗ → {0, 1}∗. Even
though the channel has access to the seed r, it will be unable to compute SC(r) by definition of the safe
function. Thus H(SC(r)) is effectively a random string to the channel. We can expand this randomness
via an expansion function (Definition 7), and use GenKeypriv with this randomness to compute a key. The
computed key is effectively secret from the channel and can be used in conjunction with Encpriv to obtain
an encoding of any input message. Note that since the decoder also has access to r, it may also compute
the secret key using exactly the same procedure and use this key in conjunction with Decpriv to perform the
required decoding. Thus the use of Cldc∗ , safe and expansion functions on a random seed reduces the setting
to that of Cpriv. Our framework is parameterized by [SC,Cldc∗ ,Cpriv].
Explicit Constructions: We provide explicit constructions of LDCs against adversarial pROM channels
permitting δ−safe functions by instantiating the framework discussed above. Figure 3 gives an overview of
the instantiation. For private LDCs, we will make use of the constructions of Theorem 5. Furthermore, we
instantiate Cldc∗ as follows: The encoder encodes the seed with a standard constant rate error correcting
code – we instantiate this with Justesen codes – composed with a repetition code. The local decoder then
randomly samples seed-encodings and takes a majority vote over the decoded samples to determine the seed.
We refer the reader to Appendix A for a formal explanation of this LDC∗ instantiation.
Detailed descriptions of our encoder (EncH(·)final ) and decoder (Dec
H(·)
final ), given a message x, security parameter
κ, and random oracle H(·), may be described in Figure 4. In particular, our framework lead to the following
theorem.
Theorem 1. Let Cpriv[Kpriv, kpriv] = (Encpriv,Decpriv,GenKeypriv) be a (`priv, ρpriv, ppriv, priv)−private LDC and
Cldc∗ [Kldc∗ , kldc∗ , κ] = (Encldc∗ ,Decldc∗) be an (`ldc∗ , ρldc∗ , pldc∗)−LDC∗. Then for any class C of pROM
algorithms admitting a δ−safe function SC : {0, 1}kldc∗ → {0, 1}∗, the (Kfinal, kfinal)2 coding scheme in
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Enc
H(·)
final (x, κ)[SC,Cldc∗ ,Cfinal] :
1. Sample a random seed of length kldc∗ .
r← {0, 1}kldc∗
2. Encode random seed using an LDC.
Yldc∗ := Encldc∗ (r)
3. Generate randomness uncomputable by channel via
safe and expansion functions.
R := E
H(·)
τ (SC(r))
4. Generate a secret key from the randomness.
skfinal := GenKeypriv(κ;R)
5. Use private LDC encoder with generated key.
Ypriv := Encpriv(x, κ, skfinal)
6. Output Ypriv ◦ Yldc∗
Dec
H(·),Y′priv◦Y′ldc∗
final (i, κ)[SC,Cldc∗ ,Cfinal] :
1. Decode the original random seed.
r := Dec
Y ′ldc∗
ldc∗ ()
2. Compute randomness used by encoder.
R := E
H(·)
τ (SC(r))
3. Compute secret key used by encoder.
skfinal := GenKeyOPS(κ;R)
4. Use private LDC decoder with computed key.
Output Dec
Y ′priv
priv (i, skfinal)
Figure 4: Encoding and decoding algorithms for our LDC construction.
the random oracle model Cfinal[SC,Cldc∗ ,Cpriv] = (EncH(·)final ,Dec
H(·)
final ) is an (`final, ρfinal, pfinal, final)-LDC with
kfinal = kpriv, Kfinal = Kldc∗ + Kpriv, `final = `final + `ldc∗ , ρfinal = 1Kldc∗+Kpriv min{ρldc∗Kldc∗ , ρprivKpriv}, pfinal ≥
1− kpriv(2− ppriv− pldc∗), final ≤ priv + qδ. Here q is an upper bound on the number of queries any algorithm
AH(·) ∈ C makes to the random oracle H(·).
The final codeword generated by EncH(·)final is simply the concatenation of the codewords generated by
Encpriv and Encldc∗ , resulting in Kfinal = Kldc∗ +Kpriv. By construction, the only queries Dec
H(·)
final makes to the
corrupted codeword are during the executions of Decldc∗ and Decpriv. This gives the locality `final = `ldc∗+`priv.
Furthermore for correct overall decoding, it is necessary that the individual codes are correctly decoded. Thus
the total errors that the code can tolerate is bounded by the maximum number of errors any individual one
of the codes can tolerate. This gives the claimed (worst case) error rate. We emphasize that the proofs of
the bounds on the decoder’s success probability and the security of the framework is much more involved
than the above discussion and is included in Section 3.3 and 3.4. In particular, we show that no adversary
admitting δ-safe functions can distinguish between the encodings of EncH(·)final and those of Encpriv with random
strings appended to them. Furthermore, even the decoder, who has no computational restrictions and gets
the appropriate secret key used during the respective encoding processes may not make this distinction,
thereby effectively reducing the security of Cfinal to that of Cpriv with negligible loss. The following two
corollaries exhibit decoding probability vs locality tradeoffs when our framework is instantiated with the
LDC∗s in Appendix A and the private-LDCs of Appendix D.
Corollary 1. For security parameter κ, a class C of pROM adversaries admitting δ−safe function SC :
{0, 1}log1+ε κ → {0, 1}∗ where ε > 0 and for every k > 0 such that k = poly(κ) where poly is any non-zero
polynomial, there exists a (βk, k)2 coding scheme in the random oracle model that is an (`, ρ, p, ,C)−LDC
where ` = (α + 1) log1+ε κ (such that α ≥ 17), ρ is a constant, p is a constant dependent on α, and
 ≤ negl(κ) + qδ. Here β is a constant, negl(κ) is a negligible function of κ and q is an upper bound on the
total queries any algorithm in C makes to the random oracle.
Corollary 2. For security parameter κ, a class C of pROM adversaries admitting δ−safe function SC :
{0, 1}log1+ε κ → {0, 1}∗ where ε > 0 and for every k > 0 such that k = poly(κ) where poly is any non-zero
polynomial, there exists a (βk, k)2 coding scheme in the random oracle model that is an (`, ρ, p, ,C)−LDC
where ` = (1 + 24 log1+ε κ) log1+ε κ, ρ is a constant, p ≥ (1 − negl1(κ)), and  ≤ negl2(κ) + qδ. Here β is
a constant, negl1(κ) and negl2(κ) are negligible functions of κ, and q is an upper bound on the total queries
any algorithm in C makes to the random oracle.
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Precomputation. We remark that Steps 1-4 of EncH(·)final may be precomputed. This may be advantageous
in some settings to speed up encoding time as the sender may precompute multiple (skFINAL,CJREP) pairs.
When a message is ready to be encoded, the sender then simply needs to generate COPS using skFINAL and
append CJREP to generate the final codeword. However, we do note that this precomputation must be done
after the selection of the random oracle, and that such precomputation is not possible for DecH(·)final .
Multi-round Communication. Existing constructions of private LDCs [OPS07] are secure only for a
single round of communication (see Appendix D for details on the round-based game between the en-
coder/decoder and the channel in the private LDC setting). We may generalize our model to be in terms of
rounds as well, where each round runs an instance of the experiment LDC− Sec− Game defined in Section
2.4. We remark that our codes work for this generalized model as well. In every round of the experiment,
the encoder can sample a fresh random seed r. This is not directly possible in the existing private LDC
constructions as an attacker listening to the decoder’s queries may learn information about the secret key
after a single round of communication. For this Ostrovsky et al. introduce a new construction which hides
the secret key behind a layer of encryption, which in turn increases the locality of their final constructions
to ω(log2 κ).
3.3 Two-Phase Hybrid Distinguisher Argument
To prove the security of the LDC framework in section 3.2, our approach is to argue the following: if any
channel wins the LDC-Sec-Game against an instantiation of our LDC constructions (EncH(·)final , Dec
H(·)
final ), then
this channel can win the priv-LDC-Sec-Game against its constituent private-LDC (contradicting its security
guarantee).
Standard Hybrid Argument Failure: A natural attempt to prove this, yet one that fails, is to use the
following standard hybrid argument. In the first hybrid we use our original encoding scheme EncH(·)final to obtain
a codeword Ypriv(0) ◦ Yldc(0). In the second hybrid, we replace the second component with an encoding of a
random unrelated nonce to get Ypriv(1) ◦ Yldc∗ (1). Here Yldc∗ (1) is an encoding of some random nonce which
is sampled completely independent of the message encoding Ypriv(1). We would like to argue that the two
hybrids are indistinguishable and conclude that a resource bounded channel cannot fool the local decoder
from original encoding scheme (first hybrid) — since we cannot fool the private-LDC local decoder in the
second hybrid. However, if the distinguisher D is able to evaluate the safe-function then the hybrids are
trivially distinguishably. On the other hand, if we assume that the distinguisher D is resource bounded like
the channel then indistinguishability does not suffice to argue that the local decoder i.e., fooling the decoder
does not yield a resource bounded distinguisher D since the decoder is not constrained in the same way as
the resource bounded channel.
Two-Phase Argument Overview: We address the previous issue by introducing a two-phase distinguisher
game defined over adversary/distinguisher pairs. In the first phase of this game, a random coin toss b ∈ {0, 1}
randomly selects one of the hybrid encoders to encode a message. The selected hybrid hands its encoding
Ypriv
(b)◦Yldc∗ (b) to the adversary AH(·) which outputs a corrupted codeword Yhyb(b)
′
. In the second phase, the
distinguisher D is given the initial message x, the corrupted codeword Yhyb(b)
′
, along with the secret key sk(b)
used to obtain Ypriv(b), and tries to predict the value of b, i.e., which hybrid encoder was used. An important
point to note is that D is not constrained in any way. However, it is not given access to the random oracle.
We show (Lemma 2) that for any such attacker-distinguisher pair, the distinguisher succeeds at guessing
which hybrid encoding was used with at most negligible probability. The two phase hybrid argument allows
us to reason about our original goal: the probability that the channel fools the honest decoder. In particular,
a channel that wins the LDC-Sec-Game with non-negligible probability can be used in phase 1 in conjunction
with a distinguisher that can simulate the decoding algorithm (with the correct key) in phase 2 to distinguish
between the hybrids with non-negligible probability. This gives the required contradiction (Lemma 3). We
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formally define the two hybrid encoders in Figure 5.
Enc
H(·)
0 (x, κ)[SC,Cldc∗ ,Cpriv]: (same as Figure 3)
1. Sample a random seed of length kldc∗ .
r(0) ← {0, 1}kldc∗
2. Encode random seed using an LDC∗.
Yldc
(0) := Encldc∗ (r(0))
3. Generate randomness uncomputable by channel via
safe and expansion functions.
R(0) := E
H(·)
τ (SC(r(0)))
4. Generate a secret key from the randomness.
sk(0) := GenKeypriv(κ; R
(0))
5. Use private LDC encoder with generated key.
Ypriv
(0) := Encpriv(x, κ, sk
(0))
6. Output Ypriv(0) ◦ Yldc(0)
Enc
H(·)
1 (x, sk
(1), κ)[SC,Cldc∗ ,Cpriv]:
1. Sample a random seed of length kldc∗ .
r(1) ← {0, 1}kldc∗
2. Encode random seed using an LDC∗.
Yldc∗
(1) := Encldc∗ (r(1))
3. Use private LDC encoder with input key.
Ypriv
(1) := Encpriv(x, κ, sk
(1))
4. Output Ypriv(1) ◦ Yldc∗ (1)
Figure 5: Hybrid encoding algorithms. By design, EncH(·)0 is the same as our proposed LDC construction.
Let AH(·) be an adversarial channel belonging to a class C of pROM algorithms w.r.t random oracle
H(·) permitting δ−safe functions. Furthermore, let D : ({0, 1}∗)4 → {0, 1} be a computationally unbounded
algorithm. We will term AH(·) and D as attacker and distinguisher respectively. Using the hybrid encoders
in Figure 5, we define the indistinguishability experiment ExpA,D,H,κ,x over all attacker-distinguisher pairs
(AH(·),D). Note that in this experiment, D is provided with the secret key that the selected hybrid used
during encoding, and does not have access to the random oracle. With respect to this experiment, we define
the advantage of the attacker-distinguisher pair as follows:
AdvA,D := max
x
∣∣∣∣Pr[ExpA,D,H,κ,x = 1]− 12
∣∣∣∣
where the probability is taken over the randomness of D, AH(·), and the selection of the random oracle H(·).
Our first aim will be to show that the advantage of any attacker-distinguisher pair, as defined above, is
negligible at best.
Let (AH(·),D) be any attacker-distinguisher pair and hybrid encoders be instantiated with parameters
[SC,Cldc∗ ,Cpriv]. For security parameter κ and message x, consider an execution of the indistinguishability
experiment ExpA,D,H,κ,x. Let badA be the event that the attacker queries the random oracle at position
c ◦ SC(r(b)) where r is the random seed chosen by the selected hybrid encoder EncH(·)b and c is any constant
expressed in binary. Furthermore, let succ be the event where the attacker-distinguisher pair succeed in
distinguishing the hybrid encodings in the experiment, i.e., the event where ExpA,D,H,κ,x = 1
The next proposition follows from the observation that conditioning on the event badA not occurring,
the secret key skb used during the encoding process remains (information theoretically) private to both the
adversary and the distinguisher. To the pair, EncH(·)0 appears information theoretically identical to Enc
H(·)
1
which gets a secret key as its input, and thus any advantage on distinguishing the encoding schemes would
allow the pair to distinguish between random strings.
Proposition 1. Pr[succ|badA] = 1/2
12
ExpA,D,H,κ,x: \\message x and security parameter κ:
Phase I
1. Encode message with both hybrids. Let sk(0) and sk(1) be the secret keys used by first and second hybrid respec-
tively.
Yhyb
(0) := Enc
H(·)
0 (x, κ).
Yhyb
(1) := Enc
H(·)
1 (x, κ, sk
(1)).
2. Flip an unbiased coin to randomly select a hybrid encoding.
b← {0, 1}
3. Hand the selected encoding to the channel to get corrupted codeword.
Yhyb
(b)′ := AH(·)(x, κ,Yhyb(b))
Phase II
1. Distinguisher, given the message, secret key, corrupted codeword, and security parameter, guesses the coin toss.
b′ := D(x, sk(b),Yhyb(b)
′
, κ)
2. ExpA,D,H,x,κ =
{
1 iff b′ = b
0 otherwise
Figure 6: Indistinguishability experiment for the attacker-distinguisher pair.
The following lemma shows that the advantage for any attacker-distinguisher pair is negligible.
Lemma 2. AdvA,D ≤ qδ2 for any execution of the game ExpA,D,H,x,κ. Here q is an upper bound on the
number of queries AH(·)makes to the random oracle.
Proof. Consider some execution of the game ExpA,D,H,x,κ. Using conditional probability to partition the
event space, the advantage of the attacker-distinguisher pair is:
AdvA,D =
∣∣∣∣Pr[succ]− 12
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣Pr[succ|badA] Pr[badA] + Pr[succ|badA] Pr[badA]− 12
∣∣∣∣
By Proposition 1, we may view the event of succ conditioned on badA not occurring as an unbiased random
choice. Thus AdvA,D =
∣∣∣∣Pr[succ|badA] Pr[badA] + 12 (1 − Pr[badA]) − 12 ∣∣∣∣. This allows us to bound the
advantage of the attacker-distinguisher pair by a factor of the probability of event bad occurring by AdvA,D =
Pr[badA]
∣∣∣∣Pr[succ|badA]− 12 ∣∣∣∣ ≤ Pr[badA] 12 . Therefore by Lemma 1, the advantage of the attacker-distinguisher
pair for the execution of ExpA,D,H,x,κ is at most
qδ
2 .
3.4 Security and Decoding Probability of Constructions
Note that EncH(·)0 is identical to Enc
H(·)
final and Enc
H(·)
1 is identical to Encpriv with random strings appended to its
output. Consider a (`priv, ρpriv, ppriv, priv)−private LDC instance Cpriv[kpriv,Kpriv] = (Encpriv,Decpriv,GenKeypriv)
and an instantiation of our constructions Cfinal[SC,Cldc∗ ,Cfinal] = (EncH(·)final ,Dec
H(·)
final ). With respect to these
instances, we define final as the following:
final := Pr[LDC− Sec− Game[A, x,H, κ, ρ, p] = 1 against Cfinal]
Consider the codes C0 = (Enc
H(·)
0 ,Dec
H(·)
final ) and C1 = (Enc
H(·)
1 ,Dec
H(·)
priv∗) formed by our hybrid encoders. Here
Dec
H(·)
priv∗ is defined identical to Decpriv except that it ignores the strings appended to the output of Encpriv
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during the encoding execution of EncH(·)1 . With respect to these codes, we define the following:
0 := maxAH(·)∈C
Pr[priv− LDC− Sec− Game[A, x, κ, ρfinal, pfinal] = 1 against C0]
1 := maxAH(·)∈C
Pr[priv− LDC− Sec− Game[A, x, κ, ρfinal, pfinal] = 1 against C1]
Note that by our definitions, 0 = final and 1 ≤ priv. The second observation follows from the following:
1 = maxAH(·)∈C
Pr[priv− LDC− Sec− Game[A, x, κ, ρfinal, pfinal] = 1 against C1]
≤ max
AH(·)∈C
Pr[priv− LDC− Sec− Game[A, x, κ, ρfinal, ppriv] = 1 against C1]
≤ max
A∈C
Pr[priv− LDC− Sec− Game[A, x, κ, ρpriv, ppriv] = 1 against Cpriv] = priv
where the first inequality follows because pfinal ≤ ppriv, while the second inequality follows since ρfinalKfinal ≤
ρprivKpriv i.e., the attacker gets to make more corruptions against Cpriv. Lemma 3 upper bounds |0 − 1| ≤ qδ
and it immediately follows that final ≤ priv + qδ.
Lemma 3. |0 − 1| ≤ qδ. Here q is an upper bound on the number of queries the attacker makes to the
random oracle.
Proof. Recall that an attacker wins the LDC− Sec− Game[A, x,H, κ, ρ, p] if there exists some index which
the corresponding decoder fails to decode with probability at least p. Suppose for sake of contradiction
that |0 − 1| > qδ for some attacker AH(·). Consider the distinguisher D′ in Figure 7. With respect to the
indistinguishability experiment, D′ takes as input the original message x, the corrupted codeword y′b, the
key used by hybrid b during encoding, and the security parameter κ.
Distinguisher D′(x, y′b, skb, κ):
1. Computes b by enumerating over all i, running Dec
y′b
priv(i, κ) and checking whether Decpriv fails to decode correctly
with probability at least ppriv.
2. return b′ =
{
1 with probability b
0 otherwise
Figure 7: Distinguisher that uses the Decpriv decoding algorithm.
Note that the computationally intensive step 1 of D′ is possible since we assume no computational restrictions.
Thus by conditional probability, the advantage of distinguisher D′ paired with any AH(·) ∈ C may be given
by
AdvA,D′ =
∣∣∣∣Pr[succ]− 12
∣∣∣∣ = 12 ∣∣Pr[succ|b = 0]− Pr[succ|b = 1]∣∣
=
1
2
∣∣(1− 0)− (1− 1)∣∣ = 1
2
|1 − 0| ,
where the penultimate equality is by definition of the distinguisher D′. Our initial assumption |0 − 1| > qδ
then implies that AdvA,D > qδ2 , contradicting Lemma 2.
The following proposition is a direct consequence of Lemma 3 and the observation that 1 ≤ priv.
Proposition 2. 0 ≤ priv + qδ where q is an upper bound to the number of queries that the attacker makes
to the random oracle.
Finally, we complete the proof by showing that that final ≤ 0 in Lemma 4. Combined with proposition 2
this completes the proof since final ≤ 0 + qδ.
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Lemma 4. final ≤ 0
Proof. Let faili denote the event that Dec
H(·)
final incorrectly decodes xi for i ∈ [k]. We define succ to be the
event that priv− LDC− Sec− Game[A, x, κ, ρfinal, pfinal] = 1 against C0 to simplify notation. It suffices to
argue that Pr[faili|succ] ≤ (1 − ppriv) + (1 − pldc∗) for any i ∈ [k] since Pr[succ] = 0. Let key be the event
that DecH(·)final recovers the correct seed r
(0) from Yldc(0). We first observe that
Pr[faili|succ] = Pr[faili|succ, key] Pr[key|succ] + Pr[faili|succ, key] Pr[key|succ]
≤ Pr[faili|succ, key] + Pr[key|succ]
Second we observe that Pr[key|succ] ≤ 1 − pldc∗ since there are at most ρfinalKfinal ≤ ρldc∗Kldc∗ errors in the
second part of the codeword Yldc(0). Finally, observe that by definition we have Pr[faili|succ, key] ≤ 1− ppriv.
The claim now directly follows.
4 Constructing Safe Functions
In this section we provide several examples of safe functions in the parallel random oracle model (pROM)
[AS15]. We first define the parallel random oracle model and introduce several cost metrics that measure
the resources used by a pROM algorithm AH(·).
4.1 Parallel Random Oracle Model
Computation in the pROM proceeds in rounds. Each round ends when the algorithm A outputs a batch
of random oracle queries to be answered in parallel and a new round begins when the attacker receives the
answer(s) to this batch of queries. In between rounds the Amay perform arbitrary computation. Formally, in
the initial round the pROM algorithm A takes input x, performs some arbitrary computation, and outputs a
state σ1 and list ~u1 = (u11, . . . , u1q1) of random oracle queries. In general, we then have (~ui+1, σi+1) = A(σi,~ai)
where ~ai = (H(ui1), . . . ,H(uiqi) are the answers to the qi random oracle queries ~ui = (u
i
1, . . . , u
i
qi) asked in
the previous round. The execution ends in round t if the algorithm A returns an output value y = σt along
with an empty batch of random oracle queries ~ut = ∅. We use
TraceA,R,H(x) = (σ1, σ2 · · · , σt, ~u1, . . . , ~ut)
to denote the sequence of states (and oracle queries) output when we run the pROM attacker A(x) on input
x fixing the random oracle H(·) and fixing A’s random coins R.
Cost Metrics. Figure 8 defines the resources we will consider as characterizing the cost of a partic-
ular execution trace T = TraceA,R,H(x). We can define the time (resp. space) cost as time(T ) = t (resp.
space(T ) = maxi≤t |σi|). Similarly, the space time cost measures the product space− time(T ) = t·maxi≤t |σi|
and cumulative memory complexity measures CMC(T ) = ∑ti=0 |σi|. Intuitively, cumulative memory com-
plexity captures the amortized space time complexity of a function that we want to evaluate many times in
parallel [AS15]. Finally, the cumulative query cost is CQ(T ) = ∑ti=1 |~ui|.
For a resource R listed in Figure 8, the term R complexity will refer to a upper bound on resource R.
Definition 8. (Resource Bounded Algorithms) We use CCQ,q to refer to the set of all pROM algorithms A with
the property that for all inputs x, random oracles H(·), and all random strings R, we have CQ(TraceA,R,H(x)) ≤
q. We use Cspace,M, ⊂ CCQ,q to refer to the subset of all pROM algorithms A with the additional constraint
that for all inputs x, random oracles H(·), and all random strings R, we have CQ(TraceA,R,H(x)) ≤ q and
space(TraceA,R,H(x)) ≤ M . Similarly, Ctime,T,q ⊂ CCQ,q (resp. Cspace−time,S,q ⊂ CCQ,q) refers to the subset of
all pROM algorithms A with the additional constraint that for all inputs x, random oracles H(·), and all ran-
dom strings R, we have time(TraceA,R,H(x)) ≤ T (resp. space− time(TraceA,R,H(x)) ≤ S). The definition of
CCMC,M,q is symmetric — we add the additional constraint that CMC(TraceA,R,H(x)) ≤M for all x,R,H(·).
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Resource Notation Definition
Time time(T ) t
Space space(T ) maxti=0 |σi|
Space-Time ST(T ) space(T ) · time(T )
Cumulative memory CMC(T ) ∑ti=0 |σi|
Cumulative query CQ(T ) ∑ti=0 ~ui
Figure 8: Resource Definitions
The assumption that the channel is resource constrained with respect to one or more of the above resources
(time, space, cmc, etc.) is natural in most real word settings. For example, if a low latency channel uses
AH(·) to compute the corruptions to an encoded message then we can plausibly assume that the attacker
A ∈ Ctime,M,q is time bounded — M denotes the maximum number of sequential evaluations of H(·) before
the corrupted codeword must be delivered. It would also be reasonable to assume that the total number of
random oracle queries q is polynomial in the relevant parameters. One can also argue that in most practical
settings the channel A will have other resource constraints e.g., space-bounded etc. In general one can define
complexity classes for various combinations of resource constraints — see Definition 9.
Definition 9. For constraints M = (M1, . . . ,Mp) on resources R = (R1, . . . ,Rp) listed in Figure 8, the
constraint class CR,M is the set of all pROM AH(·)such that AH(·)is R-bounded with constraints M. Here,
a pROM algorithm is said to be R-bounded with constraintsM if for all i ≤ p and on all inputs x, random
coins R, and random oracles H(·), we have
Ri
(
TraceA,R,H(x)
) ≤Mi.
SCRYPT. Alwen et al. [ACP+17] proved that Percival’s [Per09] memory hard function scrypt is maxi-
mally memory hard. In particular, scryptN can be computed in sequential time N , but any pROM attacker
evaluating the scrypt function has cumulative memory complexity at least Ω(N2w), where w is the length
of the output. Thus, scrypt could be used to obtain safe functions for the classes CCMC,S,q and Cspace−time,S,q
— observe that CMC(T ) ≤ space− time(T ) for any execution trace T .
4.2 Sequentially Hard Function
The hash iteration function f(x) = H(x)t+1, defined recursively as H(x)t+1 = H(H(x)t) where H(x)1 = H(x),
is a simple example of a safe function for the class Ctime,T=t,q of time bounded attackers — see Claim 1. The
trade-off is sharp since it is trivial to compute f(x) in sequential time t+ 1. This is a desirable property in
our context since the encoder/decoder both need to compute f(x) for a random input x.
We remark that the proof of Claim 1 is very similar to an argument of Cohen and Pietrzak [CP18].
Our bound is slightly tighter, but less general. Cohen and Pietrzak [CP18] proved that any pROM algorithm
running in time t can produce an arbitrary H-sequence with probability at most O
(
q2
2w
)
. We can reduce
the bound to O
(
qt
2w
)
since the attacker needs to compute a specific H-sequence i.e., L1, . . . , Lt+1 with
Li = H(x)
i. In general, we may have q  t.
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Claim 1. Let f(x) = H(x)t+1 and let  = (t+ 1)t/2w+1 + (qt+ 1)2−w then the function f is -safe for the
class Ctime,T=t,q.
Proof. (sketch) Let Li := H(x)i. We remark that if L1, . . . , Lj−1 are all distinct then
Pr
[
Lj = H(Lj−1) ∈ {L1, . . . , Lj−1
] ≤ (j − 1)2−w.
Thus, the probability of the event COL that Li = Lj for some 1 ≤ i < j ≤ t+ 1 is at most 2−w
∑t+1
j=1(j−1) =
(t+ 1)t/2w+1. We say that a particular random oracle query u in round i is lucky if the output is H(u) = Lj
but the label Lj−1 had not previously been observed as the output to any earlier random oracle query. If i
denotes the maximum index such that Li has been observed as a random oracle output, then the probability
that a particular query u is lucky is at most
Pr[H(u) ∈ {Li+2, . . . , Lt+1}|COL] = (t− i)2−w ≤ t2−w.
Conditioning on the event COL that no collisions occur, we can apply union bounds to show that, except with
probability qt/22, there are no lucky queries. If there are no lucky queries, then after t sequential rounds the
output Lt+1 = f(x) can be viewed as uniformly random and the probability that the attacker outputs f(x)
is at most 2−w in this case.
If we let r denote the maximum number of sequential calls to H(·) that can be evaluated in a second3
then we could set t = r × Lmax, where Lmax denotes the maximum latency of the channel. Note that the
encoder/decoder would need require time marginally higher than the latency Lmax+1/r ≈ Lmax to compute
Ht+1(x).
4.3 Graph Labeling Functions
We first define a labeling function fG,H(x), given a graph G, a hash function H, and an input x.
Definition 10. Given a DAG G = (V = [N ], E) and a random oracle function H : Σ∗ → Σw over an
alphabet Σ, we define the labeling of graph G as LG,H : Σ∗ → Σ∗. In particular, given an input x the (H,x)
labeling of G is defined recursively by
LG,H,x(v) =
{
H(v ◦ x), indeg(v) = 0
H
(
v ◦ LG,H,x(v1) ◦ · · · ◦ LG,H,x(vd)
)
, indeg(v) > 0,
where v1, . . . , vd are the parents of v in G, according to some predetermined lexicographical order. We define
fG,H(x) = {LG,H,x(s)}s∈sinks(G). If there is a single sink node sG then fG,H(x) = LG,H,x(sG). We omit the
subscripts G,H, x when the dependency on the graph G and hash function H is clear.
The graph labeling function can be used to construct safe functions for several different classes of resource
bounded adversaries. In particular, the resources necessary to compute fG,H in the pROM are tightly linked
to the black pebbling cost of the DAG G.
Parallel Black Pebbling Game. A legal (parallel) pebbling P = (P0, P1, . . . , Pt) of a DAG G = (V,E)
consists of a sequence of pebbling configurations Pi ⊆ V — representing the set of labels LG,H,x(v) which
are stored in memory at time i. We start with no pebbles on the graph P0 = ∅, and can remove pebbles
from the graph (free memory) at any time. For any newly pebbled node v ∈ Pi+1 \ Pi, it must be the
case that parents(v) ⊆ Pi where parents(v) := {u : (u, v) ∈ E}. Intuitively, this is because we cannot
compute LG,H,x(v) unless each of the dependent values LG,H,x(u) for each u ∈ parents(v) is already available
in memory. In the parallel version of the black pebbling game, there is no constraint on the number of new
pebbles
∣∣Pi+1 \ Pi∣∣ that can be placed on the graph in each round.
3Bonneau and Schechter [BS14] estimated that SHA256 can be evaluated r ≈ 107 times per second on a single core processor
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The space cost of a pebbling P is defined as space(P ) := maxi |Pi| and the space complexity of a graph
is space(G) = minP space(P ). The space-time (resp. cumulative cost) cost of a pebbling P is the product
space− time(P ) := time(P )× space(P ) (resp. CC(G) = ∑i |Pi|). We remark that CC(G) ≤ space− time(G).
For constant degree graphs G with N nodes it is known that space(G) = O (N/ logN) and that CC(G) =
O (N2 log logN/ logN) [AB16]. One can also construct graphs G s.t. CC(G) = Ω(N2/ logN) [ABP17,
ABH17] and Paul et al. [PTC76] constructed a constant indegree graphG with space(G) = Ω(N/ logN) [PTC76,
ABP18] — this last bound is tight as Hopcroft et al. [HPV77] showed that any static DAG G on N nodes
with constant indegree can be pebbled with at most space(G) = O (N/ logN) pebbles.
Pebbling Reductions. In the appendix we prove that if space(G) ≥ m and S = mw/2 then fG,H is safe
for the class Cspace,S,q. The pebbling reduction is conceptually very similar to the reduction of Alwen and
Serbinenko [AS15] who proved that CMC(fG,H) = Ω(CC(G) · w) i.e., if the graph G has high cumulative
pebbling cost then fG,H is safe for the class CCMC,M,q, and by extension safe for the class Cspace−time,M,q ⊆
CCMC,M,q. In particular, given an execution trace TraceA,R,H(x) for an algorithm AH(·)(x) computing fG,H(x)
we can (with high probability) extract a legal pebbling P = (P1, . . . , Pt) for G and then use an extractor
argument to show that |σi| /w ≥ |Pi|/2 during each round i — otherwise we could derive a contradiction by
using the extractor to compress the random oracle. Thus, to construct a safe function one simply needs to
find a graph G with sufficiently large pebbling cost.
4.4 Brief Note on Candidate Constructions without Random Oracles
Recall that the proof of correctness for our LDC constructions on space bounded channels uses the random
oracle model inherently through an extractor argument showing that any space bounded channel that fools
a decoding algorithm can also essentially predict a random string. However, we do not inherently require
the random oracle model for general resource bounded channels. Thus in this section, we sketch candidate
constructions for LDCs on resource bounded channels that do not require the random oracle model.
In the case where the channel must forward the (corrupted) codeword to the receiver within a certain
amount of time, we can use other cryptographic primitives rather than a sequence of nested hash functions.
For example, time-lock puzzles [RSW96] are designed so that a sender can quickly generate a puzzle with
a solution that remains hidden until some predetermined amount of time has elapsed, even if an adversary
has a polynomially large number of parallel processors. On the other hand, the solution is straightforward
to calculate for any honest user who has spent the desired amount of time computing the puzzle. [BGJ+16]
propose time-lock puzzles through the use of succinct randomized encodings from indistinguishability obfus-
cation and the minimal assumption that “inherently sequential” languages exist.
For our purposes, an encoding algorithm can generate a time-lock puzzle whose solution is the random
key and then transmit the time-lock puzzle along with the encoded message, using some repetition code to
ensure that the time-lock puzzle can be determined by the decoding algorithm. The decoding algorithm can
then solve the time-lock puzzle to obtain the random key and decode the message. However, if the channel
is bounded by time t and the hardness parameter of the time-lock puzzle is greater than t, then the channel
cannot recover the random key. It is plausible that the same construction would also yield space-bound (or
space-time bound) puzzles from minimal assumptions.
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A Repetition with Justesen Codes
As a preliminary to this section, we require familiarity with the following form of standard one-sided Chernoff
Bounds.
Proposition 3 (Chernoff Bound). Let X1, · · ·Xn be independent random variables such that 0 ≤ Xi ≤ 1 for
each i ∈ [n]. Let Sn =
∑n
i=1Xi and µ = E[Sn]. Then for any  > 0,
Pr
[
Sn ≤ (1− )µ
] ≤ exp(− 2
2
µ
)
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In this section, we will describe our encoding scheme in order to recover the random seed r used by our main
constructions in Section 3.2. Recall that our approach was to encode r using a repetition code by repeating
r multiple (nJREP) times, and then encoding each repetition of r into cJ using an off-the-shelf error correcting
code with constant error and information rates. While any constant rate error correcting code may be used,
we make use of Justesen Codes:
Theorem 2. [Jus72] For any 0 < RJ < 1, there exist binary linear codes of rate RJ, that are efficiently
decodable from δJ(RJ) fraction of errors, where δJ is a function that only depends on RJ.
We will denote CJ = (EncJ,DecJ) as the code that achieving the guarantees of Theorem 2, i.e. having
constant rate RJ and error correction rate δJ(RJ). Let LJ denote the length of these codewords. We now
give our code constructions to recover r via repetition with Justesen codes.
EncJREP(r):
1. cJ := EncJ(r).
2. CJREP := cJ ◦ cJ ◦ . . . ◦ cJ where cJ is repeated nJREP times for a fixed nJREP.
3. Output CJREP
DecJREP(C′JREP):
1. I := Sample α indices uniform with replacement from [nJREP] for some prespecified α.
2. For i ∈ I
c
′(i)
J := C
′
JREP[iLJ, . . . , (i+ 1)LJ − 1]
r′(i) := DecJ(c
′(i)
J ).
3. Output majority(r′(1), r′(2), · · · , r′(α))
The following lemma states that the code (EncJREP,DecJREP) may be used to recover the original r with high
probability using good locality.
Lemma 5. Let CJ[RJ] be as in Theorem 2 and α be the number of samples that DecJREP makes to the corrupted
codeword. Then for all kJREP > 0, the (KJREP, kJREP)2 coding scheme CJREP[kJREP,CJ, α] = (EncJREP,DecJREP)
is an (`JREP, ρJREP, pJREP)-LDC∗ where `JREP = αkJREPRJ , ρJREP is some constant, and pJREP ≥ 1− e−α/24.
Proof. The adversary makes a total of ρJREP · LJREP corruptions to CJREP. Let ρJ = δJ(RJ). By Theorem
2, for a cJ block to be non-decodable by DecJ, the adversary must make at least ρJLJ corruptions in this
block. This allows us to bound the total blocks the adversary may corrupt as at most ρJREPLJREPρJLJ =
ρJREP
ρJ
nJREP.
Thus the probability of sampling a block that is non-decodable is at most ρJREPρJ . Setting ρJREP =
ρJ
4 , we get
that the probability of sampling a block that may be recovered is at least 3/4. Let Sα denote the number of
samples that are successfully recovered. Thus, E[Sn] ≥ 3α4 and by standard Chernoff Bounds (Proposition
3), we have that
Pr
[
Sα ≤ α
2
]
≤ exp (− α
24
)
Note that if Sα > α/2, then our majority vote succeeds in determining the original message. Thus pJREP =
Pr[Sα > 1/2]. Finally, each block has size kJREPRJ . Since we sample α blocks, we get the claimed locality.
B Memory Bounded Adversary
In this section we show that the memory complexity of the function fG,H is characterized by the space cost
space(G) in the parallel random oracle model just as Alwen and Serbinenko [AS15] showed that cumulative
memory complexity can be characterized by the black pebbling game.
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Graph Pebbling
Given a directed acyclic graph (DAG) G = (V,E), the goal of the (parallel) black pebbling game is to place
pebbles on all sink nodes of G (not necessarily simultaneously). The game is played in rounds and we use
Pi ⊆ V to denote the set of currently pebbled nodes on round i. Initially all nodes are unpebbled, P0 = ∅,
and in each round i ≥ 1 we may only include v ∈ Pi if all of v’s parents were pebbled in the previous
configuration (parents(v) ⊆ Pi−1) or if v was already pebbled in the last round (v ∈ Pi−1).
The cumulative cost of the pebbling is defined to be |P1|+ . . .+ |Pt|. Graph pebbling is a particularly
useful as a tool to analyze the security of an iMHF [AS15]. A pebbling of G naturally corresponds to an
algorithm to compute the iMHF. Alwen and Serbinenko [AS15] proved that in the parallel random oracle
model (pROM) of computation, any algorithm evaluating such an iMHF could be reduced to a pebbling
strategy with (approximately) the same cumulative memory cost.
However for our purposes, we are more concerned about the space cost rather than the cumulative
memory cost. The space of the pebbling is defined to be (P ) = maxi |Pi| and accordingly, (G) = min(P ),
where the minimum is taken over all valid pebblings P .
Reduction
Similar to [AS15] our reduction uses Lemma 6 as a core building block. In particular, if the space complexity
is significantly smaller than space(G) for a pROM attacker then we will be able to build an extractor that
receives a small hint and predicts the random oracle output on an index contradicting Lemma 6. By contrast,
a black pebbling move always corresponds to a specific random oracle query.
Lemma 6. [DKW11] Let B be a series of random bits and let A be an algorithm that receives a hint h ∈ H
and can query B at specific indices. If A outputs a subset of k indices of B that were previously not queried,
as well as guesses for each of the bits, the probability there exists some h ∈ H so that all the k guesses are
correct is at most |H|
2k
.
B.1 Memory and Cache in the Parallel Random Oracle Model
Before we present our reduction, we first recall the formal definition of space complexity in the pROM model.
Let the state of an algorithm AH(·) at time i to be σi, which contains the contents of the memory. Let AH(·)
be a pROM attacker AH(·) who is given oracle access to a random oracle H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}w. An execution
of AH(·) on input x proceeds in rounds as follows. Initially, the state at time 0 is σ0, which encodes the
initial input x. At the beginning of round i the attacker is given the initial state σi−1 as well as the answers
Ai−1 to any random oracle queries that were asked at the end of the last round. The algorithm AH(·) may
then perform arbitrary computation and choose to update the memory, outputting a new state σi, along
with a batch of queries Qi = {qi1, qi2, . . . , qkii }.
Execution Trace. Recall that the execution trace of the algorithm AH(·) is defined by the sequence of
memory states and queries made to the random oracleH. Formally, the execution trace is TraceA,R,H(A, x) =
{(σi, Qi)}ti=1, where the trace TraceA,R,H(A, x) is dependent on the algorithm AH(·), random oracle H,
internal randomness R, and input value x. Then the memory cost of the execution trace is
mcost(TraceA,R,H(A, x)) = max
i
|σi| .
Recall that Alwen and Serbinenko [AS15] show that the computation of a function fG,H with hash
function H and underlying directed acyclic graph G yields a legal black pebbling with high probability.
Thus, we use AH(·) to extract a legal P = (P1, . . . , Pt) ∈ P‖(G). Given an execution trace TraceA,R,H(x),
the corresponding pebbling BlackPebbleH
(
TraceA,R,H(x)
)
= P0, . . . , Pt is defined by setting P0 = ∅ and
define the pebbles at each subsequent time step i based on the corresponding batch of queries qi made during
iteration i. We then apply the following rules:
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• For each query q in batch qi, if the query has the form v, labH,x(v1), . . . , labH,x(vd) for some vertex v
and its parents v1, . . . , vd, then we add a pebble to node v in Pi.
• If there exists another query for v before v is used as input for a query, then v is deleted from Pi.
Intuitively, at each time j, Pj contains all nodes v whose label will appear as input to a future random
oracle query before the label appears as the output of a random oracle query. In this manner, we define
BlackPebbleH
(
TraceA,R,H(x)
)
= P1, . . . , Pt ⊆ V , which Alwen and Serbineneko show is legal with high
probability:
Theorem 3. [AS15] The pebbling extracted from an execution trace,
BlackPebbleH
(
TraceA,R,H(x)
) ∈ P‖(G),
is a legal black pebbling with probability at least 1 − q2w , where w is the label size and q is the number of
queries made by TraceA,R,H.
We now show that any algorithm AH(·) that computes fG,H(x) correctly with probability at least ε has
memory cost mcost dependent on the space complexity of the resulting legal black pebbling, space(P‖(G)).
The proof uses that fact that if an attacking strategy does not yield a corresponding legal black pebbling, then
the attacking strategy can be modified to form an extractor for the labels of a subset of nodes. Specifically,
an extractor with access to the attacking strategy, the state of the memory, and a few select hints can
successfully predict a large number of random bits, which cannot happen with high probability. The hints
given to the extractor describes the positions of the random bits, and ensure these bits remain “random”
(that is, we do not explicitly query these locations later). In particular, the extractor uses the hints to
simulate AH(·) but the hints do not include the current state of memory σi.
Theorem 4. Let G be a DAG with n nodes, w > 8 log n, q < 2w/16, and x be a fixed input. Let m =
mcost(TraceA,R,H(A, x)). For any algorithm AH(·) that makes at most q queries, let HIGH(A, x) be the
event that the attacker either uses w2 space(G) in its computation of fG,H(x) or fails to compute the function
correctly. Then
Pr
[
HIGH(A, x)] ≥ 1− q
2w
− 1
2−3mw/4
− n
2
2w+1
.
Proof. Consider an instance of AH(·) that succeeds in calculating fG,H , making at most q queries. By
Theorem 3, with probability at least 1− q2w , we can extract a legal black pebbling from AH(·). Conditioned
on the success of the extraction of a legal black pebbling, let m = mcost(TraceA,R,H(A, x)) be the space
complexity of the execution trace of the evaluation algorithm. By definition of space, there exists a time
step i such that the corresponding legal black pebbling contains at least m pebbles. Suppose, by way of
contradiction, that mcostq,ε(fG,H) < mw2 so that |σi| < mw2 . By construction of the pebbling, there is a set
S containing m labels that appear as input for a query after time step i before they are returned as output.
Moreover, there are collisions among labels with probability at most
∑n
i=1
(i−1)
2w ≤ n
2
2w+1 , so conditioned on
the event that there are no collisions among the labels, then the algorithm AH(·) would have to generate the
labels out of thin air. Specifically, an extractor using AH(·) will be able to predict m labels, each of size w
bits, using a mw2 bits of information from the state of AH(·), along with the following hint, which consists of
three parts:
1. The set S is given as a hint to denote the indices that form the string that the extractor will ultimately
predict. Since S contains m positions, then the size of this component of the hint is m log n bits.
2. For each v ∈ S, the index of the first query that appears in which lab(v) is needed as input. This
component of the hint tells the extractor the queries that require the prediction of random strings, and
has size at most m log q bits, where q is the total number of queries made by the attacker.
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3. For each v ∈ S, the index of the first query when lab(v) might be compromised. Observe that if the
extractor successfully predicts a random string at a location v, but then lab(v) is later queried by
the attacker, we cannot distinguish this case at the end from the case that the extractor simply read
lab(v) after making the query. Effectively, the extractor is no longer predicting a random string. To
avoid this, the hint given to the extractor details queries that would compromise the randomness of
the desired locations. Formally, the hint is the minimal index i such that qji = v, which yields returns
the query H(qji ) = lab(v). This component of the hint tells the extractor the locations of the random
strings to be predicted, and has size at most m log q bits.
See Figure 9 for intuition. The size of the hint is at most m log n + 2m log q bits. However, the extractor
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Figure 9: An extractor that uses the attacker to predict m distinct outputs of random oracle H(·).
is able to use AH(·) to predict m fresh input/output pairs (xi, (H(xi)) from the random oracle. That is,
the extractor can predict m labels of length w from the random oracle for a total of mw random bits from
mw
2 +m log n+2m log q bits. Thus for log n <
w
8 and q < 2
w/16, the extractor predicts mw random bits from
3
4mw random bits, which can only occur with probability
1
2−3mw/4 by Lemma 6. Hence, the probability that
the attacker either uses w2 space(G) in its computation of fG,H(x) or fails to compute the function correctly
is at least 1 − q2w − 12−3mw/4 − n
2
2w+1 , where the possible events of failure are the inability to extract a legal
pebbling from the attacker, the probability of extracting mw random bits from 34mw random bits, and
collisions among the labels, respectively.
C Code Scrambling
Code scrambling was a technique introduced by Lipton [Lip94] for transforming codes designed for the
symmetric channel, to be used against any PPT adversarial channel. Assume that the sender and receiver
share some private randomness (pi,m). Here pi is a random permutation on {1, · · · , n} and m ∈ {0, 1}n is a
random mask. n is then length of the encoding obtained by CSC = (EncSC,DecSC), a constant rate code in
the symmetric channel. Consider the following code against the PPT adversarial channel: given message x,
EncAdv (x, pi, m):
1. ySC := EncSC(x)
2. y := pi(ySC)⊕m
3. Output y
DecAdv (y’, pi, m):
1. y′SC := pi
−1(y′ ⊕m)
2. x′ := DecSC(y′SC)
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3. Output x′
The key observation is that pi and ySC are independent due to m. This may be observed by considering a
specific pi and realizing that the final encoding may take on any values due to the m. Thus if the error vector
added by the adversarial channel is E , then we have
y′SC = pi
−1(y + E + m) = pi−1(y + m) + pi−1(E) = EncSC(x) + pi(E)
Thus the errors added are random, due to the random permutation, and DecSC may recover the original
message.
D Private LDCs
Private locally decodable codes were introduced by Ostrovsky, Pandey and Sahai [OPS07]. These LDCs are
termed private as they crucially assume a secret key given to both the sender and the receiver before the
protocol, but kept private from the PPT channel.
Definition 11. Let κ be the security parameter. A private `-locally decodable code for a parameters (K, k),
is a triplet of probabilistic polynomial time algorithms (GenKey,Enc,Dec) such that:
• GenKey(κ) is the key generation algorithm that takes as input the security parameter κ and outputs a
secret key sk.
• Enc(x, sk) is the encoding algorithm that takes as input the message x of length k = poly(κ) and the
secret key sk. The algorithm outputs y ∈ {0, 1}K that denotes an encoding of x.
• Dec(j, sk) denotes the decoding algorithm, which takes as input a bit position j ∈ [k] and the secret key
sk. It outputs a single bit b denoting the decoding of x[j] by making at most ` (adaptive) queries into
a given a codeword y′ possibly different from y.
Here, ` denotes the query complexity or locality of the code and ρ is termed the error rate. Furthermore, we
say that the private LDC decodes with probability p if for PPT channels in the experiment of definition 12
(defined below) for all x ∈ {0, 1}k and i ∈ [k], we have Pr[b = x(h)i ] ≥ p
The game between the encoder/decoder and PPT adversarial channel may be described as follows:
Definition 12. A computationally bounded adversarial channel C with error rate ρ is a probabilistic polyno-
mial time algorithm which repeatedly interacts with the encoding algorithm Enc and the decoding algorithm
Dec polynomially many times until it terminates. Each iteration takes place as follows:
1. Given a security parameter κ, the key generation algorithm outputs a secret key sk ← GenKey(1κ).
The secret is given to both the sender (encoder) and the receiver (decoder) but not to the channel. The
channel is given κ.
2. In the hth iteration, the channel C chooses a message x(h) ∈ {0, 1}k and hands it to the sender.
3. The sender computes y(h) ← Enc(x(h), sk) and hands the codeword y(h) ∈ {0, 1}K back to the channel.
4. The channel corrupts at most a fraction ρ of all K bits in y(h) to output the corrupted codeword y′(h),
i.e., HAM(y(h), y′(h)) ≤ ρK. It gives y′(h) and a challenge bit j to the receiver’s Dec
5. The receiver makes at most ` (possibly adaptive) queries into the new codeword y′(h) and outputs
b← Dec(j, sk).
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Using such a setup, Ostrovsky et al. give explict constructions of one-time private LDCs i.e. LDCs that
may be used for exactly one-round of communication in definition 12. They achieve this by code scrambling
(Appendix C) a simple repetition code of the original message. Good locality is then achieved by reading and
unscrambling only the bits exactly corresponding to indices of repetitions of the queried bit. It turns out that
this simple code does not have good rate as the number of repetitions that need to be applied per symbol of
the original message in the repetition code is not constant. Due to this, the authors employ a strategy where
the message to be encoded is divided into blocks of small size. Each block is then encoded using an error
correcting code of constant rate, and then the concatenation of all the encoded blocks is scrambled using
the secret key. Good locality is achieved by reading and unscrambling only the bits exactly corresponding
to the block containing the queried bit. Specifically, Ostrovsky et al. give constructions of private LDC
(GenKeyOPS,EncOPS,DecOPS) over the binary alphabet and show the following against adversarial channels:
Theorem 5 ([OPS07]). Let f(κ) be any function such that f(κ) = ω(log κ). Then, there exists a constant
ρOPS such that (GenKeyOPS,EncOPS,DecOPS) is a one time private `OPS-locally decodable code with `OPS = f(κ)
and constant information rate (βOPS) that correctly decodes from error rate ρOPS with probability at least
1− 2−`OPS .
In Section 2.3, we introduce Definition 4 as an alternative to working with Definitions 11 and 12. Further-
more, we make use of this alternative definition of private-LDCs throughout the main sections. We thus
present Theorem 5 in an alternative form where private LDCs are presented as Definition 4. We use this in
instantiating our framework in Section 3.2 (Corollaries 1 and 2).
Theorem 6 (Alternative to Theorem 5). Let f(κ) be any function such that f(κ) = ω(log κ). Then,
for security parameter κ and for all K > k > 0 such that k = poly(κ) where poly is any non-zero
polynomial, there exists a (K, k)2 coding scheme COPS[K, k, κ] = (GenKeyOPS,EncOPS,DecOPS) that is a
one-time (`OPS, ρOPS, pOPS, OPS)−private LDC where `OPS = f(κ), ρOPS is a constant, pOPS = 1, and
OPS ≤ k
(
e
4
)−ρOPS`OPS is negligible in the security parameter.
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